

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 06129 01 OF 02 161740Z

41

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

----- 015133

P R 161635Z NOV 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2203

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 6129

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SALT: HIGHLIGHTS OF RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH
SOVIET DELEGATION (SALT TWO - 363)

1. SUMMARY. DURING COURSE OF PAST WEEK, NUMEROUS CONVERSATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF SOVIET DELEGATION PRODUCED SOVIET COMMENTS ON REDUCTIONS, U.S.-SOVIET ONGOING PROGRAMS, MIRVS, THROW-WEIGHT, NEW GENERATION SSBNS AND SLBMS, FBS, AND PARTIAL AGREEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. REDUCTIONS. DURING POST-MEETING DISCUSSION NOV. 13, SEMENOV REFERRED TO A TYPED BRIEF AND SAID (TO JOHNSON, A-474) THAT AT ONE MEETING JOHNSON HAD ASKED HOW THE U.S. SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET POSITION CONCERNING REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. SEMENOV SAID THAT HE WISHED TO CLARIFY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE A PROVISION FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION WOULD, TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, DEPEND UPON OUR PROGRESS IN ADOPTING MORE COMPLETE MEASURES FOR THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND OUR ABILITY TO WORK OUT SUCH MEASURES AS WOULD ENSURE EQUAL SECURITY AND THEREBY ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY PREREQUISITES FOR REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 06129 01 OF 02 161740Z

3. U.S.-SOVIET ONGOING PROGRAMS. AT NOV. 14 DINNER HOSTED

BY SOVIET DELEGATION, SHCHUKIN (TO NITZE, A-471) SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD AMBASSADOR JOHNSON EARLIER IN THE EVENING THAT HE THOUGHT IT UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT EITHER SIDE WOULD HALT THE MAJOR PROGRAMS THAT THEY NOW HAD UNDERWAY -- THE TRIDENT, AND B-1 PROGRAMS ON THE U.S. SIDE AND THE NEW ICBM PROGRAMS ON THE SOVIET SIDE. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IN HIS PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE HIGHER AUTHORITY ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY REPROACHES MADE CONCERNING THE U.S. TRIDENT AND B-1 PROGRAMS AS HAD BEEN MADE BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, A SOLUTION COULD BE WORKED OUT, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ONE WHICH DID NOT INVOLVE THE PRESENTLY ONGOING MAJOR PROGRAMS OF THE TWO SIDES. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS GREAT HOPE IN THE THROW-WEIGHT CONCEPT INTRODUCED BY THE U.S. SIDE. SHCHUKIN MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE THOUGHT THE CONCEPT SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE SLBMS AND AN APPROPRIATE FACTOR FOR HEAVY BOMBERS.

4. MIRVS. AT NOV. 14 SOVIET DINNER, SHELEPIN (TO MENDELSON, A-475) SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY MIRV CONSTRAINTS WHICH DID NOT DEAL WITH BOTH ICBMS AND SLBMS. IN RESPONSE TO MENDELSON'S QUESTION WHETHER PHRASE "AGREED PORTION" PERTAINED TO NUMBERS, PERCENTAGE, OR CLASSES OF MISSILES, SHELEPIN SAID, "LET THE U.S. SIDE MAKE A PROPOSAL. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANYTHING, IF IT INCLUDES LIMITS ON SLBMS, AS WELL AS ICBMS."

5. AT NOV. 13 SCC MEETING, MAZERKIN, IN RESPONSE TO FITZGERALD'S QUESTION (A-468), SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE COULD NOT AGREE TO LIMIT ICBM MIRVS ALONE, SINCE SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD STIMULATE A SLBM MIRV RACE. THIS, HE SAID, WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH SALT OBJECTIVES. MAZERKIN ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. ICBM MIRV PROPOSAL WOULD LIMIT ONLY ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL U.S. MISSILE WARHEAD FORCE, LEAVING THE REMAINING TWO-THIRDS UNCONSTRAINED, CONSIDERING THAT THE POSEIDON MISSILES COULD CARRY AS MANY AS 14 WARHEADS. IN ADDITION, HE SAID, THE U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD LIMIT THE SOVIET SIDE TO MANY LESS ICBM MIRVS THAN THE U.S. SIDE. IN RESPONSE TO FITZGERALD'S OBSERVATION THAT UNDER THE U.S. PROPOSAL THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE THE SAME POSSIBILITY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 06129 01 OF 02 161740Z

TO MIRV ITS SLBMS, MAZERKIN REPLIED THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY WHAT HE MEANT WHEN HE HAD REFERRED TO A SLBM MIRV RACE.

6. THROW-WEIGHT. SHELEPIN (TO MENDELSON, A-475) NOTED THAT, IF THE SIDES WERE TO DISCUSS THROW-WEIGHT LIMITATIONS, THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVED THAT ALL THREE SYSTEMS, I.E., ICBMS, SLBMS AND HEAVY BOMBERS, WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AS AN AGGREGATE.

7. NEW GENERATION SSBNS AND SLBMS. AT NOV. 16 SCC MEETING, MAZERKIN, IN RESPONSE TO FITZGERALD'S QUESTION (A-481), REPEATED HIS EARLIER STATEMENT (A-378) THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY BAN "NEW GENERATION" SLBMS SINCE A BAN ON "NEW GENERATION" SSBNS WOULD AUTOMATICALLY MEAN A BAN ON SUCH SLBMS. MAZERKIN OBSERVED THAT THE RETROFITTING OF A TRIDENT MISSILE TO A POSEIDON SUBMARINE WOULD MEAN ANOTHER SPIRAL IN THE ARMS RACE, SINCE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW SUIT. WHEN FITZGERALD POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS ALREADY DEPLOYING ON ITS NEW SUBMARINES A MISSILE WITH A RANGE AT LEAST AS GREAT AS THAT OF THE FUTURE TRIDENT MISSILE, MAZERKIN SAID THAT THE USSR PRESENTLY HAS A PROGRAM -- THE "DELTA-CLASS" -- SUBMARINE WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO THE POSEIDON PROGRAM. IN THIS CONNECTION, MAZERKIN SAID THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S. HAD APPLIED THE NAME "DELTA-CLASS" TO THE NEW SOVIET SUBMARINE SINCE, IN U.S. TERMINOLOGY, IT IS A MODIFIED (MODERNIZIROVANNY) "YANKEE-CLASS" SUBMARINE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 06129 02 OF 02 161754Z

41

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

----- 015240

P R 161635Z NOV 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2204

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 6129

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

8. FBS. AT NOV. 13 SOVIET-HOSTED LUNCHEON (A-473), GRAYBEAL AND KLOSSON ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE HAD REALLY THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS WAS IN THE SOVIET INTEREST. THEY POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE THIRD COUNTRIES WHICH LOOKED TO THE U.S. FOR PROTECTION BY U.S. NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. IF SUCH

SYSTEMS WERE WITHDRAWN, THESE COUNTRIES WOULD FIND THEMSELVES STILL CONFRONTED BY THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF SOVIET NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND THESE COUNTRIES MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIRED NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES. WITHOUT REPLYING DIRECTLY TO THE QUESTION, GRINEVSKY AND SMOLIN SAID THAT THE U.S. COULD STILL MAINTAIN A NUCLEAR UMBRELLA FOR THIRD COUNTRIES THROUGH ITS CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

9. GRINEVSKY (A-473) ADDED THAT THE SUBJECT SHOULD BE DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS: THE FIRST WAS FOR THE U.S. AND USSR TO AGREE THAT THE PROBLEM OF U.S. "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS" EXISTED, THE SECOND WOULD BE TO FIND SOME INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION. GRINEVSKY VOLUNTEERED THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT HAD PUT FORWARD THE "MOST RADICAL SOLUTION" TO THE FBS PROBLEM. GRAYBEAL AND KLOSSON POINTED OUT THAT BY ADVOCATING AN "INTERMEDIATE" SOLUTION, THE SOVIET SIDE SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT THE NON-CENTRAL PROBLEM WAS NOT AS SERIOUS AS IT CLAIMED. THEY ADDED THAT, IN VIEW OF ALL THE COMPLICATED FACTORS INVOLVED, THE U.S. NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROPOSAL WAS CLEARLY THE ONLY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 06129 02 OF 02 161754Z

FEASIBLE APPROACH SINCE IT WOULD MAINTAIN THE PRESENT BALANCE AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO SECURITY.

10. AT NOV. 13 SCC MEETING MAZERKIN ASKED (FITZGERALD, A-468) WHEN WOULD THE U.S. TAKE ACCOUNT OF CARRIER-BASED AVIATION. IN THE SOVIET VIEW, HE SAID, THERE ARE FIVE TYPES OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS: ICBMS, SLBMS, STRATEGIC OR HEAVY BOMBERS, CARRIER-BASED AVIATION AND FBS. WHEN FITZGERALD REPLIED THAT THE LATTER TWO TYPES WERE TACTICAL, MAZERKIN DISAGREED, POINTING OUT THAT IN SALT THE U.S. SIDE CALLS CARRIERS "TACTICAL" BUT AT BUDGET HEARINGS THE U.S. NAVY TALKS ABOUT THE VALUE OF CARRIERS AS "STRATEGIC" WEAPONS. IN RESPONSE TO FITZGERALD'S QUESTION WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE COULD SERIOUSLY BELIEVE THAT ONE CARRIER - BASED AIRCRAFT WAS COMPARABLE TO AN ICBM, MAZERKIN REPLIED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ONE A-7 WAS COMPARABLE TO ONE, TWO, OR PERHAPS THREE MINUTEMAN-3 WAS A QUESTION WHICH THE TWO SIDES COULD DISCUSS AND REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON HOW TO COUNT INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT IN TERMS OF ONE ICBM. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD, HOWEVER, PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT CERTAIN BARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT CAN CARRY TWO NUCLEAR WEAPONS (BOYEPRIPASY) WHICH ARE ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT TO THE PAYLOAD OF CERTAIN ICBMS.

11. PARTIAL AGREEMENTS. AT NOV. 13 SCC DINNER, TURALIN, IN RESPONSE TO FITZGERALD'S QUESTION (A-469) SAID THAT SEMENOV'S REFERENCE TO "PARTIAL AGREEMENTS" IN HIS NOV. 13 STATEMENT WAS BASED ON PARA 6 OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS. TURALIN, HOWEVER, COULD NOT SUGGEST ANY AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL

"PARTIAL" AGREEMENTS OTHER THAN THE NON-TRANSFER AREA
DISCUSSED BY SEMENOV.
JOHNSON

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: martinjw
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SALTT06129
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731127/aaaaatty.tel
Line Count: 226
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: martinjw
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 JAN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31-Jan-2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <20 FEB 2002 by martinjw>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SALT: HIGHLIGHTS OF RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET DELEGATION (SALT TWO - 363)
TAGS: PARM
To: SECSTATE WASHDC WASHDC
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005